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Extended abstract 
A general problem, which may concern practical contexts of different nature, is 
to aggregate multi-agent orderings of different alternatives into a single 
“consensus fused ordering”. It is assumed that there are M decision-making 
agents* D1, D2, …, DM, each of which defines an ordering of n alternatives a, b, 
c, etc.. For any two alternatives a and b, this ordering allows statements like 
a > b, a ~ b, b > a, where symbols “>” and “~” respectively mean “strictly 
preferred to” and “indifferent to”. Also, it is assumed a rank-ordering over the 
agents, based on their individual importance. This other ordering admits 
relations of strict preference and indifference too. 
For the purpose of example, Fig.1 shows the preference orderings by four 
fictitious agents (D1 to D4,). In this case, the agents’ importance ordering is 
assumed to be D1 > (D2 ~ D3) > D4. 
The problem of interest is fairly general [1, 2, 3, 4] and can be applied to a 
variety of practical contexts, such as: 
                                                          
* By a decision-making agent we will consider any of a wide variety of different types of entities. 
Examples could be human beings, individual criteria in a multi-criteria decision process or 
software based intelligent agents on the Internet. 
2  
Omitted alternatives 
Incomparable alternatives 
Null
(a, d and e) with f
b 
d 
f 
c 
path A 
path B 
Key: 
c 
b 
a 
d, e f 
a 
b 
c 
d 
e 
a 
b 
c, d, e 
f 
partial Type of ordering linear linear linear 
None None None 
{a, e} Null {f} 
D2 D3 D1 D4 Agent 
Ordering 
 
Fig. 1. Graphical representation of the preference orderings by four fictitious agents. The alternatives 
of interest are a, b, c, d, e and f. The agents’ importance ordering is D1 > (D2 ~ D3) > D4. The 
preference ordering by D1 is partial (with some incomparable alternatives) while the remaining are 
linear (in some cases with omitted alternatives).  
 
 multi-criteria decision processes; e.g., determination of the best location 
where to install a new manufacturing plant, based on several criteria – such 
as road/railway infrastructure, electrical supply, presence of satellite 
industries, labour cost, etc. – where criteria are just ordered, with no precise 
weight; 
 intelligent customization of data displayed on Internet sites, based on 
several ordered criteria (e.g., for advertising decisions); 
 synthesis of customer requirements, evaluated on ordinal scales by a sample 
of questionnaire/interview respondents, in the Quality Engineering field. 
 
An interesting aspect of this problem is the importance hierarchy of agents, 
which is simply given by an ordering and not defined on an interval or ratio 
scale [5]. Contrary to many other decision-making problems, in this case a 
weight depicting the absolute importance of each agent is not defined. For this 
reason, this decision-making framework can be denominated as “ordinal semi-
democratic”. The adjective “semi-democratic” indicates that agents do not 
necessarily have the same importance, while “ordinal” indicates that their 
hierarchy is defined by a crude ordering. This makes the set of the possible 
solutions to the problem relatively wide, since  they may range between the two 
extremes of (i) full dictatorship – in which the fused ordering coincides with the 
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preference ordering by the most important agent (dictator) – and (ii) full 
democracy, where all agents are considered as equi-important. 
Over ten years ago, Yager [6] proposed an algorithm to address the above 
problem in a relatively simple, fast and automatable way. Unfortunately, this 
algorithm has two important limitations: (i) the resulting fused ordering may 
sometimes not reflect the preference orderings by the majority of agents [7] and 
(ii) it is only applicable to (non-strict) linear orderings without incomparabilities 
and omissions of the alternatives of interest (such as that one by D3 in Fig. 1). 
The objective of this paper is to enhance the algorithm by Yager so as to 
overcome its limitations and adapt to less stringent preference orderings. The 
new algorithm can be interpreted as a generalization of that by Yager and has 
two main advantages: (i) it better reflects the individual multi-agent preference 
orderings and (ii) it is more flexible, since it is applicable to (non-strict) partial 
orderings (such as that one exemplified in Fig. 1), which admit omitted or 
incomparable alternatives. Also, it is automatable, continues to satisfy the 
properties of the standard Yager’s algorithm, and can be applied to a larger 
variety of practical contexts, providing more realistic results. Tab. 1 summarizes 
the requirements that the new algorithm  is supposed to meet. 
Tab. 1. Requirements of the new algorithm. Symbols “” and “” identify those 
satisfied and non-satisfied by the standard Yager’s algorithm. 
Requirements Yager’s  
1. Each agent can have its own individual preference ordering over the alternatives. 
2. Agents (can) have a hierarchical importance ordering. 
3. The algorithm should be automatable. 
4. The preference orderings should include the possibility of ties between two or 
more alternatives. 

5. The preference orderings should include the possibility of omitting one or more 
alternatives. 

6. The preference orderings should include the possibility of incomparability 
between two or more alternatives. 

7. The logic for selecting alternatives should reflect the preference ordering for the 
majority of agents. 

8. All agents (can) have the same importance (full democracy). 
 
A potential limitation of the new algorithm is related to the mechanism for 
aggregating and/or comparing elements from different preference orderings. The 
underlying assumption is that the degree of preference of the alternatives in 
different preference orderings depends on their relative position. 
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The description of the new algorithm and its potential is supported by 
several practical examples. 
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